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Abstract 
 
 This essay explores the profoundly gendered nature of the split between the 
disciplines of economics and sociology which took place in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, emphasizing implications for the relatively new field of economic sociology. 
Drawing on historical documents and feminist studies of science, it investigates the 
gendered processes underlying the divergence of the disciplines in definition, method, 
and degree of engagement with social problems. Economic sociology has the potential to 
heal this disciplinary split, but only if the field is broadened, deepened, and made wiser 
and more self-reflective through the use of feminist analysis. 
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Sociology, Economics, and Gender: 
Can Knowledge of the Past Contribute to a Better Future? 
 
Julie A. Nelson 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Nicole Hollander’s Sylvia comic strip periodically asks “How well do you know 
your genders?” Readers are presented with two quotes, and asked to assign a gender to 
each.  In this spirit, consider the following two excerpts from scholarly pronouncements: 
 
The Society shall operate as a completely disinterested, scientific 
organization…Its main object shall be to promote studies that aim at 
the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-
quantitative approach to [word deleted] problems and that are 
penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking similar to that which 
has come to dominate in the natural sciences.   
 
The [members of our Society] do not imagine that they are appointed 
to destroy the vocation of other investigators of [word deleted]. They 
feel themselves called to represent factors in the problems of human 
association which have thus far received less than their share of 
attention. In organizing a society, they are not beginning, but 
continuing, the work of winning for those neglected factors the 
appreciation they deserve. The society makes no appeal for credit. It 
simply proposes to encourage [word deleted] inquiry and to await 
competent judgment of results. 
 
Note, in the first quote, the bold claims to scientificity, the repetitive emphasis on 
quantitative analysis, and the appeal to association with the “hard” sciences.  Note the 
strong verbs and adjectives used, and especially the quasi-sexual (from a sexist and 
macho-masculine viewpoint) language.  It says, We’re going to penetrate and dominate, 
too! 
The second quote, in contrast, practically apologizes for existing. It says, in effect, 
we are really not encroaching on anyone…we don’t want to steal anyone’s thunder…we 
just feel that something is calling us to point it out…we don’t want too much, only what’s 
fair…we’re not doing anything radical…we won’t expect to get any recognition for our 
work…we’d just like to be supportive…our job is to wait. It has subservience and 
passivity written all over it—strongly reflecting the sexist imagination of feminine sexual 
and social roles. 
 
The first quote is an excerpt from the “Scope of the Society” adopted by the 
Econometric Society on  the occasion of its founding in 1930 in Cleveland, Ohio.  This 
statement is printed inside the cover of every issue of the Society’s journal 
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(Econometrica), and the deleted word is “economic.” It was drafted by a group of fifteen 
men (Roos 1933), and its gender is decidedly masculine. While the founders of the 
Econometric Society represented the mathematical vanguard of their time, the entire 
profession of economics has since shifted in that direction. The typical contemporary 
paper in the flagship journal of the American Economic Association, the American 
Economic Review, is now more mathematically sophisticated than anything published by 
the Econometric Society during the 1930s. 
 
The second is from the editorial announcement of the formation of the American 
Sociological Association (then called the American Sociological Society), reporting on its 
first conference in Providence, Rhode Island.  It appeared in 1907 in The American 
Journal of Sociology (American Sociological Society 1907a), the members called 
themselves “sociologists,” and the deleted words are “society” and “sociological.” The 
ASA at this time was also a male-dominated organization. Of the seven papers published 
from the first conference, one was by a woman. Of the 115 names in the original list of 
members, only 15 clearly refer to females (American Sociological Society 1907b).1 The 
excerpt quoted above seems to have been noncontroversial, at least insofar as it was 
reproduced by later leaders in the field without comment (Small 1916, 784-785). While 
the society was predominately male in sex at its founding, the gender of the passage 
announcing its establishment is decidedly feminine. 
 
Though a variety of means, the fields of economics and sociology in the United 
States marked off separate methodological and subject-matter territories in the years 
surrounding the turning of the twentieth century. Now, in the years surrounding the 
turning of the twenty-first century, the field of economic sociology is challenging some 
of those longstanding divisions. The gauntlet thrown down is the simple—but quite 
radical—assertion, as expressed by Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, that “the 
economic process [is] an organic part of society” (Smelser and Swedberg 2005b, 6).  
 
The thesis of this essay is that ignoring the heavily gendered nature of the 
historical and still-existing split between the discipline of economics and the discipline 
sociology is naïve, and harmful for the future development of economic sociology. 
Understanding how sexist, dualistic, and hierarchical notions of gender have shaped the 
two disciplines could open the door to richer, stronger, more resilient and less biased 
forms of scholarly practice.  
 
First, a few caveats. This essay does not pretend to be a comprehensive history of 
the disciplines. It does not address many issues that importantly shaped the formation of 
the disciplines during this period, including but not limited to the distribution of political 
and economic power; historical developments in U.S. industrial capitalism; the legacy of 
slavery and abolition; immigration issues; and regional interests.2 Neither is the intent of 
this essay to denigrate important scholarship on gender issues and the difficulties faced 
by feminist scholars within each discipline.3 Nor should this essay be understood as 
seeking to reify dualistic, hierarchical gender categories—that is, as making any claim 
that cultural understandings of “masculine” and “feminine,” and perceptions of their 
relative worth, are related to some underlying essence. Rather, the intent is to show how 
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the stamp of common cultural habits of dualistic, hierarchical gendered thinking is 
vividly clear in the history of the split between the two disciplines.  
 
 
On Sex versus Gender 
 
The most obvious connection between gender and the shaping of the fields of 
sociology and economics has been the division of subject matters.  The discipline of 
economics4 has historically neglected subjects that particularly affect women, such as 
unpaid household labor, intra-family economic relations, labor market discrimination, 
and the social and emotional dimensions of occupations involving human relations and 
care. Women’s experiences in paid employment and in families only began to be 
discussed within economics in the 1970s, and even then extremely reductionist 
approaches predominated. Sociology, on the other hand, has had the study of families 
within its boundaries from the start. The Section on the Family, for example, was one of 
only seven sections formed within the ASA by 1925 (American Sociological Association 
2008).  Sociology has also been more open than economics to discussion of power 
relations and the gendering of occupations. While feminist sociologists have (rightly) 
complained that these subject matters are marginalized and of lower prestige within 
sociology than more masculine-associated topics, these subjects have at least been 
granted a place at the table. In contrast, when I was a student in the 1980s, economics 
students expressing a wish to study issues relating to women, families, or gender were 
frequently advised that these were sociological—not economic—topics.  They likely still 
are so advised today, in many departments. 
 
Paula England and Nancy Folbre, in their essay for the second edition of the 
Handbook of Economic Sociology (England and Folbre 2005), point out that economic 
sociology is in danger of reinscribing the sexist bias of neoclassical economics regarding 
the subject of inquiry. If economic sociology is thought to be only a matter of bringing 
sociological methods to bear on “the economy,” and “the economy” is defined as markets 
and business institutions, then the pattern is perpetuated. England and Folbre point out 
that the 1994 version of the Handbook relegated discussion of gender to a last section on 
the “intersections” of the economy with presumably “non-economic” areas of life (2005, 
628).  The 2005 version (Smelser and Swedberg 2005a), however, shows no progress on 
this score.  
 
Another obvious link to sex and gender is the demographics of the practitioners of 
the two fields. A more substantial proportion of sociologists, sociology faculty, and 
sociology students have been female than is the case in economics. For example, in 1966, 
when 15% of doctoral degrees in sociology were awarded to women, women received 
only 4% of the doctoral degrees granted in economics. In 2006, the figures were 64% in 
sociology and 31% in economics (U.S. Department of Education 2008).  
 
The concern of the present essay is not the sex of subjects of study or the sex of 
practitioners, however, but rather with gender, or the associations cultures build up on top 
of the observation of the preponderance of sexual dimorphism. In particular, the concern 
 
4 
GDAE Working Paper No. 09-04: Sociology, Economics, and Gender 
 
 
is with the  cognitive functions of gender—that is, how gender structures the way we 
think.  Psychological study has shown, for example, that many people remember lists of 
words better when the items in the list all belong to the same culturally-defined gender 
grouping (e.g. “butterfly” and “blushing”) than when the word lists are mixed or neutral 
(Bem 1981). In contemporary U.S. culture, dogs are gendered masculine and cats 
feminine. Even abstract shapes are gendered—curvy, enveloping ones usually perceived 
as feminine, and sharp, angular ones as masculine. The purpose of pointing out these 
associations is not to endorse or reinforce them—many feminist and queer theorists have 
(appropriately) sought to complicate such binary views. Rather, the purpose for the 
present discussion is to highlight cognitive gendering as, whether one likes it or not, an 
extant psychological phenomenon.  Only by bringing such a phenomenon from an 
unconscious and unexamined level out into the open, can its ramifications be discussed. 
 
Feminist scholars of science including Evelyn Fox Keller (Keller 1985) and 
Sandra Harding (Harding 1986) have pointed out how such gendered patterns of thought 
have influenced the development of scientific endeavor, from the Enlightenment forward.  
Metaphors used to describe the ascension of scientific thinking over pre-scientific 
thought and nature have often taken the form of contrasts between masculine and 
feminine. As expressed by Harding, 
 
mind vs. nature and the body, reason vs. emotion and social commitment, 
subject vs. object and objectivity vs. subjectivity, the abstract and the 
general vs. the concrete and particular—in each case we are told that the 
former must dominate the latter lest human life be overwhelmed by 
irrational and alien forces, forces symbolized in science as the feminine” 
(1986, 25). 
 
Keller, Harding and others demonstrated how separation, logical consistency, individual 
accomplishment, and mathematics have long been culturally and cognitively associated 
with rigor, hardness—and masculinity. At the same time, connection, “intuitive” 
understanding, sociality, and qualitative analysis have often been associated with 
weakness, softness—and femininity. Such associations were sometimes explicit in the 
language used by the early scientists to define their endeavor. Henry Oldenburg, an early 
Secretary of the British Royal Society, for example, stated that the intent of the Society 
was to "raise a masculine Philosophy … whereby the Mind of Man may be ennobled with 
the knowledge of Solid Truths." (Keller, 1985, 52).   
 
Cognitive gender also—and crucially—tends to be hierarchical in the dominant 
culture.  The term “virile,” for example, refers to a masculine trait with a positive 
connotation, while the term  “effeminate” carries negative valence, and “emasculated” 
indicates a lack of manly vigor. Masculinity is traditionally associated with strength, and 
femininity with weakness, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Reading the early accounts of professional societies in the United States reveals a 
recurring concern with defining disciplines that could be thought to be scientific. The 
separate fields of economics and sociology were formed out of an earlier, more 
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amorphous “social science,” which in the 1860s included history, “political economy,” 
politics, social work, and sundry other endeavors. The following two sections explore the 
manner in which gendered understandings of science served to shape the formation of the 
disciplines of economics and sociology, respectively. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Masculine, Positive 
virile 
 
 
 
emasculated, effeminate 
Feminine, Negative 
 
 
Cartesianism and the Formation of Economics 
One could go back to Descartes, and his split between res cogitans and res 
extensa  to begin talking about how economics came to model itself around assumptions 
of (hyper-) rationality and detachment, and an insistence on the economy being 
considered as profoundly a-social.5 Or one could find the origin of the idea of the 
economy as an inhuman, purely mechanical system (driven by the “energy” of self-
interest) in the work of Adam Smith.6  A crucially important development closer in time 
to of the formation of the disciplines in the United States, however, is an 1836 essay by 
John Stuart Mill.  In it, Mill carefully distinguished economics from other disciplines, 
laying out both the central assumptions and the methodology which neoclassical 
economists would come to adopt. 
  
In “On the Definition of Political Economy,” Mill attempted to carefully 
distinguish economics from the physical sciences and technology, from ethics, and from a 
more general study of social behavior. Political Economy is distinguished from physical 
science, he wrote, because it is about “phenomena of mind” (1836, 29, emphasis in 
original) rather than about physical laws.  Among the mental sciences, it is further 
distinguished by the particular “part of man’s [sic] nature” (36) with which it deals.  
Conscience, duty, and other feelings relevant to a person’s dealings with other individuals 
were consigned by Mill to the realm of ethics (34). Principles of human nature that have 
to do with life in society were consigned by Mill to the realm of “speculative politics,” 
which he also called “social economy” (35). With issues concerning physical bodies, 
ethics, and social interactions split off and assigned to other disciplines, Political 
Economy would deal with what was left.  It should, Mill wrote, deal with “man 
[sic]…solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of 
the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (38).  Here is the nub of the 
rational-choice-theory definition of economics: the original description of “economic 
man.”  
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Why did Mill do all this slicing and dicing? Mill believed that he had to separate 
out a very thin slice of human nature for analysis by each of the various fields because 
this was required by the nature of science. Significantly, his model for science in this 
essay was Cartesian geometry.  Political Economy, Mill thought, could only proceed as a 
“pure” and  “abstract” science, resulting in general truths and timeless laws, if it posited a 
minimal set of starting principles.  Political Economy and geometry, he claimed, both 
“must necessarily reason…from assumptions, not from facts” (1836, 46). Political 
Economy presupposes “an arbitrary definition of man” for the same reason that 
“[g]eometry presupposes an arbitrary definition of a line, ‘that which has length but not 
breadth’” (46).   
  
Mill, to his credit, in principle left his premises open (64).  He argued that no 
political economist would ever be “so absurd as to suppose that mankind” is really 
described by only the parts of human nature selected for study in Political Economy (38).  
In any application, he said, Political Economy would need to be complemented by the 
insights of other sciences that had focused on other parts of human nature and other 
circumstances (58), and also by practical knowledge of specific experiences (68).  
  
What remained and flourished in later economic thought, however, was not Mill’s 
modesty concerning the ad hoc premises and limited applicability of the geometry-like 
discipline he proposed, but rather his idea that Political Economy must become a 
axiomatic-deductive enterprise in order to be “scientific.” This approach received a big 
boost in later in the 19th century when neoclassical economists (including Francis 
Edgeworth, Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras, and Vilfredo Pareto) found that they could 
mathematically formalize Mill’s idea of economic behavior as simply the pursuit of 
“wealth,” using models borrowed from Newtonian physics. The notion that economic 
research is centrally defined by abstract mathematical modeling of consumers’ desire to 
maximize utility, and firms’ desire to maximize profit, was born, and continues to be 
central to the mainstream definition of the field to this day.  
  
This definition of economics as a narrow exercise in deductive logic and 
mechanics did not go entirely uncontested, however. Richard T. Ely, founder of the 
American Economic Association (AEA) in 1885, was one of a group of scholars—many 
of whom later went on to become sociologists—who were influenced by the German 
Historical School. Reflecting on the founding of the society, Ely wrote: 
 
We believed that economics had, in itself, the potency of life.  In the 
vast field of research which lay before us…we felt we had 
opportunities for service of many kinds . . . We saw a good deal of 
poverty on the one hand and a concentration of wealth on the other 
hand; and we did not feel that all was well with our country…We 
thought that by getting down into this life and studying it carefully, we 
would be able to do something toward directing the great forces 
shaping our life, and directing them in such a way as to bring 
improvement. (Ely 1938, 155-56)  
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The first platform of the AEA was largely the work of Ely, and he included in it 
prominent references to social problems, human progress, and the role of the state (Coats 
1960; Ely 1936, 144; Furner 1975). 
  
Within a few years, however, the AEA platform was watered down, and all of the 
references to problems, progress, and the state were deleted (Tobin 1985). This change 
was largely, in later history, portrayed as a debate over methods, rather than one of basic 
goals and values—that is, about whether the economy should fundamentally be seen as 
being alive and social, as opposed to mechanical. By the 1930s the mathematical and 
mechanical approach—confused with a notion of scientific “objectivity”—had clearly 
risen in ascendance, as evidenced by the above-quoted Econometric Society statement. 
Rather than see ourselves as—with Ely—engaged in the solution to social problems, 
economists tend to see our role as being neutral and detached technical advisors to 
decision-makers, whose only motivation is the search for pure and precise truth. It is, 
presumably, left up to the decision-makers to choose the goals. Whether one calls it 
“scientism,” “objectivism,” “positivism,” or any of the other names that philosophers and 
historians of science use to refer to the (rather peculiar) belief that all knowledge must 
mimic Newtonian physics, the victory of this view among mainstream economists has 
been nearly complete. 
 
Also crucial in the development of economics was economist Lionel Robbins’ 
1935 precedent-setting definition of economics as the science of choice-making. Robbins 
defined economics as “the science which studies human behavior as a relationship 
between scarce means which have alternative uses” (1935, 15).  Scarcity, here, refers to a 
perceived imbalance between presumably unlimited human wants and a level of 
resources that is insufficient to satisfy them all. In the static neoclassical model, the focus 
of attention is the internal, individual, mental process of choosing so as to maximize 
utility or profits, given the (presumed) universality of scarcity.  
 
But when “scarcity” became a central defining motif, what was shunted aside in 
the process?  Note that the antonym for “scarcity” is “abundance.” And note that, 
especially in food-rich, goods-rich, industrialized societies, “abundance” would be at 
least as appropriate a term for describing economic life. Then consider the cultural 
symbols that represent abundance.  The cornucopia or horn of plenty is mythologically 
the horn of the female goat that nursed young Roman god Zeus, accidently broken off.  
Zeus gave it back with the promise that it would always be filled.  The cornucopia is one 
of the symbols of the Roman goddess Fortuna, the female symbol of luck who was given 
offerings by mothers. Abundance is associated with fertility and fecundity, in turn 
associated with women and with the earth. No wonder then, that in a world in which 
masculinity is associated with higher value (Figure 1), a status-seeking discipline would 
want to align itself with “scarcity” instead. 
  
Economics, then, captured the high status ground.  It took on the “masculine” 
subjects of markets and business.  It took on the study of these with a “masculine” 
armory of rigorous (-seeming) precise, mathematical, deductive, abstract tools. It took as 
its agents individuals imagined to be thoroughly—masculinely—rational and individual, 
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detached from all social connection, and living in a tough, dog-eat-dog world of 
competition for scarce resources. The notion of scientific objectivity promoted is one that 
relies on detachment—detachment from detachment from social influences, detachment 
from the object of study, detachment from other researchers, and detachment from 
practical and ethical concerns. 
  
And economics got away with it.  For roughly a hundred years, other social 
scientists and people in general have simply nodded their heads when faced with 
propositions like “firms maximize profits” or “people, in their economic lives, act out of 
self-interest.” After all, to assert otherwise—to assert that economic life is part of social 
life—would be to question “hard science” and appear emasculated or effeminate.  Or so it 
has been understood. 
 
 
“Leftovers” and the Formation of Sociology 
As economics moved away from sociology, the latter was considered by some to 
be made up of  the “leftovers: marriage, the family, poverty, crime, education, religion, 
and sex” (Furner, 298).  The areas that economics was eager to shed—areas of women’s 
traditional activity and of pressing social problems—landed on the doorstep of sociology. 
Sociology’s methods and models also remained more diverse, and its connection to social 
change more salient. 
 
The writings of Frank Sanborn offer an early—and explicitly gendered—
discussion of the contrast between Mill’s Political Economy and social analysis. Sanborn 
was the founder of the Department of Social Economy of the American Social Science 
Association.  This association was founded in 1865 and was the precursor of the 
associations for many disciplines, though it later itself became defunct. Working off 
Mill’s definitions, Sanborn wrote in 1887 that Social Economy is “the feminine gender of 
Political Economy, and so, very receptive of particulars, but little capable of general and 
aggregate matters” (quoted in Haskell 1977, 137). Apparently Sanborn did not see the 
association of his life work with femininity or particularity as a weakness, but rather 
believed that Social Economy had a heightened capacity to engage in social reform and 
address human suffering (Haskell, 136-7).  
 
But an unsettling sense that sociology is not quite a science is also a strong 
recurring theme in writings about the origin of the discipline. The opening sentences of 
Lester Ward’s account of “The Establishment of Sociology,” for example, rather 
defensively reads, “I do not propose on this occasion to enter into any defense of the 
claims of sociology to be called a science. I wish simply to show that its history, and the 
steps in its establishment, do not essentially differ from those of other sciences” (Ward 
1907), 581). John Lewis Gillin in “The Development of Sociology in the United States”  
wrote that “much still remains to make [sociology] a science (1927, 17).  
 
Clearly one of the issues is that of methods. In the period between the two World 
Wars, science and objectivity became increasingly identified, within the social sciences, 
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with the gathering of statistics (Ross 1991; Smith 1994). While defending techniques 
such as case studies, Gillin in 1927 still took quantitative analysis as the gold standard for 
science: “There are certain problems in sociology, however…to which the statistical 
method has not yet been successfully applied” (1927, 18, emphasis added).  The yet is 
telling, as Gillin seems to leave open the possibility that further “scientific” development 
could close this gap.  
 
A more dramatically scientistic stance was taken by William Fielding Ogburn, 
who, in his 1929 Presidential Address claimed that the future of sociology lay in adopting 
“strictly scientific methods,” so that “everyone will be a statistician”(Ogburn 1930, 2, 5). 
Ogburn believed that science allows thinking to be “freed from the bias of emotion” (4). 
Ogburn explained that the roots of his views lay in this own experience:  
 
My father, planter and merchant, died in 1890 when I was four.  Then 
began my long struggle to resist a dear mother’s beautiful but 
excessive love.  To the successful outcome, I attribute my strong 
devotion to objective reality, [and] an antipathy to the distorting 
influence of emotion. (Ogburn, quoted inLaslett 1990, 423) 
 
Here we see a case in which the hierarchical, dualistic linking of gender with 
methodological prestige is made perfectly explicit: women (mothers), love, and emotion 
are firmly placed on  the inferior side, as things to be resisted, while men (fathers), 
science, and—as Ogburn put it (1930, 2)—“wholly colorless” knowledge are made the 
goal. 
 
Besides methods, another hotly debated issue was the relation of sociology as a 
knowledge-seeking (and science-aspiring) discipline to the goal of the amelioration of 
social problems. While Ely’s attempt to keep economics involved with social betterment 
was quickly defeated within his own discipline, many accounts of the early development 
of sociology take a more encompassing view, seeing the two orientations as 
complementary (e.g. Gillin, 21, 25; Small, 770-71). Gender was apparent here as well, of 
course: Women such as Jane Adams were major leaders of the socially-engaged, 
settlement house variety of early sociological research and social reform, while men 
predominated in the more detached university positions (Silverberg 1998).  
 
Major battles about the proper relationship of scholarly work to engagement with 
social problems were fought within sociology at the turn of the 20th century (Furner 
1975), during the inter-war years (Smith 1994),7 and again in the early 1950s (Bernard 
1973). But the battle within sociology has never been definitively won by the scientistic 
separatists. “Engaged” research and social criticism are still, today, legitimized within the 
broad umbrella of sociology (even if they may not be at the most prestigious core) in a 
way that contrasts sharply with the situation in economics. 
 
But, since “science” has been associated with masculinity and cool detachment, 
this all comes at a cost. Sociologists do not have nearly as large a line for funds at the 
National Science Foundation. The President consults no Council of Sociological 
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Advisors. Sociologists’ salaries are on average lower than those of economists (Spalter-
Roth and Scelza 2008). Sociologists might aspire to publish in economics journals, but 
the reverse is not true. Sociologists are by and large regarded by economists as doing 
“soft” and inferior  work, not deserving of equal status with their own.  For example, 
economist and ex-Harvard President Larry Summers’ belief, reported in the press, that 
economists are “smarter than” sociologists (Bombardieri 2006) tends to be, in my 
experience, shared by most economists (as well as many in the public who feel cowed by 
displays of mathematical expertise).8 Some of the differences in tangible resources and 
power may well be due to those with economic and political dominance preferring to 
support research that buttresses, rather than challenges, their positions of advantage. But 
that does not explain the general relative disrespecting of sociological research, since 
much sociology is not engaged in such critique. In terms of Figure 1, sociologists are 
clearly, when taken as a group, positioned on the down and feminine side, no matter what 
their particular sex, interests, abilities, or degree of critical leaning may be. 
 
 
Either/Or: The “Hostile Worlds” View 
 
Sociologists have, at least until recently, for the most part stayed submissively on 
their side of the disciplinary dividing line established near the turn of the 20th century. A 
whole way of understanding the relation of economic and social life has, in fact, grown 
up around and been reinforced by this disciplinary division. The view that Viviana 
Zelizer (Zelizer 2005) calls “hostile worlds” depends exactly on this contrast between 
human society and presumably inhuman economics. While sociologists (as well as many 
in psychology and the humanities) generally study human interdependencies and often 
elaborate on their emotional and ethical complexity within some areas of life, when the 
topic turns to economics they often suddenly reveal a schizophrenic view of human 
nature.  People in their lives in markets and commerce, they say, are driven by self-
interest. Capitalist firms function to maximization of profit, they assert. Economics is 
quantitative, and the measuring rule of money flattens out all social meaning, they repeat.  
 
This division has been reified even by some feminist sociologists.  For example, 
in her influential 1973 essay on revolutions in sociology, Jessie Bernard presented 
without critique the idea that women historically have tended to live in a social, relational 
“status world,” intrinsically characterized by love, duty, particularism, and affectivity, 
while men have lived in an economic, cold “cash-nexus world,” characterized by money 
exchange, self-orientation, universalism, and emotional neutrality.9 Such dichotimizing 
preemptively rules out recognizing both the self-interested and sometimes even violent 
dimensions of family relationships, and the the relational, emotional, and ethical 
dimensions of business and commerce. 
 
 “Hostile worlds” advocates generally regard themselves as the defenders of 
meaning and ethics against the capitalist onslaught—that is, as defenders of the goals of 
social betterment (or at least human survival) against the forces of mechanistic economic 
systems and laws. They see themselves as brave critics of the existing system, in contrast 
to other, presumably co-opted, social scientists who seek only to make capitalism run 
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more smoothly. But in actuality the insistence that economic life is mechanical and a-
social simply kowtows to neoclassical economics to a rashly undue extent.  It is 
neoclassical economics, not the actual study of organizational behavior, for example, that 
has generated the (unfounded) belief that firms single-mindedly maximize profit. It is a 
priori assertions by neoclassical economists, not actual study of psychology or human 
social behavior, that has created the belief that agents within capitalist firms are 
motivated only by money. Rather than representing radical critique, the “hostile worlds” 
view actually reflects the subservient posture reflected in the above-mentioned 
description of the founding of the ASA: We promise not to infringe on your territory—
you get to describe the economy.  We’ll keep our social analysis to ourselves. 
 
Sociology has not yet made a case for the importance of its subject matters, the 
validity of its goals, or the reliability of it methods equal in strength to the case made by 
economists.  Economists claimed all the “high ground” of science, conceived of as 
detached and mathematical.  As long as the hierarchical and sexist associations of 
economics with masculinity, detachment, science, and high value, on the one hand, and 
sociology with femininity, sociality, softness and lesser value are allowed to stand, the 
situation is unlikely to change. 
 
 
Both/And Thinking 
 
 Sexist and hierarchical habits of thinking are strong (and are strongly reinforced 
by social patterns), but they are not inevitable.  One way of attempting to avoid these 
cognitive traps is to attack the gender dualism itself—refusing to talk about gender at all, 
or multiplying the categories past two so that there are many genders and the discussion 
becomes much more complex. While these are appropriate approaches for some 
situations, the use of the dualistic gender metaphor in demarcating “hard science” is so 
strong and deeply rooted that a different, two stage, approach may be more helpful.  
  
The first stage is to very carefully unlink gender and sex, so that one does not 
jump from the acknowledgement that some characteristic is culturally coded as, say, 
feminine, to a unmerited conclusion that it is shared by, or predominant in, women. Some 
forms of cultural feminism, unfortunately, promote rather than challenge essentialist  
links—claiming, for example, that not only is emotion culturally associated with 
femininity (a factual statement), but that women are by nature more emotional than men 
(a claim that can be roundly disputed). Unlinking gender and sex, on the other hand, leads 
to the acknowledgement that men and women (and transsexual and transgendered 
persons and persons of ambiguous sexual identity) all have emotional capacities. And in 
parallel fashion, we all have rational capacities as well.  
  
The second stage is to take a modest—but potentially enlightening—step past the 
binaries of Figure 1, to explore what has been hidden by habitually overlaying the 
masculine-feminine binary with the positive-negative one. As a tool for getting past this 
habit of conflation, a “gender-value compass” (Nelson 1992; Nelson 1996) may be 
useful. Consider how the hierarchy pictured in Figure 1, for example, changes if one 
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refuses this overlay, and instead splits off the gender axis from the value axis, as shown 
in Figure 2: 
       
Figure 2 
 
           Positive 
 
    M+   F+  
    virility   muliebrity 
Masculine        Feminine 
    M–    F– 
    ?   emasculation 
 
           Negative 
 
Virility is defined in the dictionary as “manly vigor.” Emasculation is the lack thereof.  
But are all things feminine just degraded forms of masculine characteristics? If one looks 
hard enough in a sufficiently thick dictionary (or is persistent in web searching), one can 
also find the new term in the figure. “Muliebrity” is defined as “womanliness,” 
“possessing full womanly powers,” or “the feminine correlative of virility.” While not a 
term in common use, it suggests that alongside and on a par with a masculine, positive 
strengths we might also consider there to be feminine, positive strengths. The cross-
diagonal terms illustrate a condition of lack: for example, “emasculation” is an absence of 
“virility.” There is, unfortunately, currently no term in the English language for a lack of 
womanly vigor.  
  
Now, applying this sort of exercise to social science methodology, consider the 
belief that masculine, precise, quantitative methods are always preferable to less precise 
qualitative analysis. Figure 3 suggests that there are costs to focusing only on precision, 
and benefits to be had by a richer approach. 
      
Figure 3 
 
    M+   F+  
    precise ,  rich, 
    elegant   realistic 
   
    M–    F– 
    unrealistic,  imprecise, 
    thin   vague 
 
 
Practitioners of economic sociology have rightly criticized neoclassical economics for its 
often absurdly unrealistic models of economic phenomena, and presented much more 
institutionally and sociologically rich descriptions and analysis.10 Economists, on the 
other hand, routinely dismiss much sociological analysis as “vague” or “messy” simply 
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because it does not conform to standards of mathematical precision.  Usually this 
dismissal is absurd: The real world is simply not of a nature to be exclusively studied by 
the methods of mathematical symbolism and logic.  
 
It should be noted, though, that sometimes the economists’ critique of 
sociological vagueness can be to the point: Sociological studies sometimes suffer from a 
dire lack of a common vocabulary and overwhelming internal inconsistencies.11 A 
distressing tendency among some scholars in the social sciences (and humanities) to 
assert this term will mean whatever I want it to mean right now blocks, rather than 
facilitates, the creation of knowledge. A little more attention to precision and consistency 
could go a long way, in such cases, towards improving the analysis. 
 
Examined in the light of Figure 3, interminable debates about “hard” versus “soft” 
methods, or “quant” versus “qual,” lose their polarized and oppositional sting. Good 
research—as opposed to simply macho research—should be both as precise and as rich 
as possible. In many cases, this might  mean combining data crunching with case studies, 
or survey research with ethnography. At the least, it means appreciating the gaps in any 
study that draws on only one methodology. Such a standard for quality would  
undeniably make the jobs of academic researchers, reviewers, and editors more 
challenging: Instead of merely making a study conform to the methodological template 
favored by a particular school or journal, one would be forced to evaluate, in a more 
overarching and critical way, the appropriateness of the methodologies used to the 
subject of study and the contribution of the research to knowledge. 
  
Consider also the way that hierarchical, dualistic thinking creates the following 
false “either/or” choice: either one does work committed to social betterment or one does 
work that is scientifically objective. Feminist scholars of science have revealed the sexist 
biases implicit in the belief—so obviously gender-linked in Ogburn’s account of the 
source of his scientism—that objectivity is a matter of detachment. Feminist alternatives, 
such as those called “strong objectivity” by Harding (1986) or “dynamic objectivity” by 
Keller (1985, 116) incorporate a more relational approach. For example, as expressed by 
feminist philosopher Helen Longino, “The objectivity of individuals…consists in their 
participation in the collective give-and-take of critical discussion and not in some special 
relation (of detachment, hardheadedness) they may bear to their observations”  (1990, 
79). 
 
Drawing on the cultural associations of masculinity with detachment and 
femininity with connection, Figure 4 illustrates how one can envision a “both/and” 
balance of socially-engaged and reliable research, informed by a stronger conception of 
objectivity. The drive for abstraction arises from a macho fear that any emotional, value-
laden attachment necessarily compromises the search for knowledge, instead of 
acknowledging that emotions are inherently involved in all human activities. It’s end 
point is a highly refined irrelevance. The obsession of economists with abstraction well 
serves, of course, the interests of those who would prefer that problems of economic 
inequality, injustice, environmental degradation and the like not be seriously investigated. 
An over-connection with practical problems, on the other hand, leads to a “quick-fix” 
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mentality that may lead to rushed, biased recommendations. The balance of the top two 
cells reminds us that we want reliable results—but also results that in some sense matter. 
 
Figure 4 
 
    M+   F+  
   concerned with    concerned with 
   understanding   real problems 
   
    M–    F– 
   concerned only with  concerned only  with 
   abstractions   “quick-fixes” 
 
  
Regarding subject matter, a definition of economics that does not rely on either a 
masculine-biased definition based on markets and business firms, or a masculine-biased 
definition based on rational choice theory, is one based on provisioning: Economics is 
about how societies organize themselves to provide for the survival and flourishing of life 
(Nelson 1993).  Economic sociology might better progress by drawing on such a 
definition, rather than—as it does presently—on the neoclassical notion of “scarce goods 
and services” (Section on Economic Sociology 2007; Smelser and Swedberg 2005b, 3). 
A recognition of the co-constitution of economies with the natural world as well as the 
social world would also be extremely helpful, in light of pressing problems such as global 
climate change.  
  
As a final example of the use of the compass, consider the two quotes that opened 
this essay. Many would find both statements somewhat repulsive.  The Econometric 
Society statement is arrogant and overbearing, lacking in any sort of appropriate modesty 
or respect for alternative intellectual projects. It pretends to a sort of perspective-free 
knowledge that cannot actually be achieved. Meanwhile, the ASA description is wimpy 
and servile, so afraid of offending or claiming too much that it lacks any appropriate 
assertiveness. It is self-deprecating to the point of limp passivity. Rejecting this as an 
either/or choice, could we envision a scholarly discipline that is both  appropriately 
assertive, and appropriately careful about its claims, as described below?12 
      
Figure 5 
 
    M+   F+  
   appropriately assertive      appropriately careful 
   
    M–    F– 
        overbearing          servile 
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Economic Sociology: A Way Forward 
In their essay on gender and economic sociology, England and Folbre argue for an 
“integrative” approach that brings in topics related to women and draws from both 
existing sociological and rational-choice-economics approaches (2005, 627). While 
appreciating their contribution, this essay proposes something far more radical. Economic 
sociology has the potential to be the fresh breeze that begins to break apart century-old 
habits of sexist, dualistic, and hierarchical thinking about the subjects, methods, and goals 
of the social science disciplines.  It could, simultaneously, become the medicine that 
heals the split between sociology and economics. Why be satisfied with the vagueness of 
many existing sociological formulations and the empirical irrelevance of currently 
dominant economic theories?  A feminist-informed understanding of the requirements of 
truly scientific investigation—investigation that is not bound by dogmas of any kind, but 
rather open to new evidence and viewpoints and to evaluation by ever-wider 
communities—could move beyond the stultifying biases of both disciplines and lead, at 
last, to a more rich and reliable understanding of human economic life, in all its complex 
sociality. 
 
 
Julie A. Nelson is a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Development and 
Environment Institute at Tufts University and an Associate Professor of Economics at the 
University of Massachusetts, Boston; inquiries can be directed to Julie.Nelson@tufts.edu. 
 
16 
GDAE Working Paper No. 09-04: Sociology, Economics, and Gender 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acker, Joan. (2006). "Introduction: 'The Missing Feminist Revolution' Symposium." 
Social Problems 53(4): 444-447. 
American Sociological Association. 2008. "History of Sections in the ASA." 
http://www.asanet.org/cs/root/leftnav/sections/history_of_sections_in_the_asa 
American Sociological Society. (1907a). "The American Sociological Society." 
American Journal of Sociology 12(5): 579-580. 
—. (1907b). "List of Members." American Journal of Sociology 12(5): 736-738. 
Aspers, Patrik, Sebastian Kohl, Jesper Roine, and Philipp Wichardt. 2008. "An Economic 
Sociological Look at Economics." Pp. 5-15 in economic sociology_the european 
electronic newsletter. Accessed at http://econsoc.mpifg.de/archive/econ_soc_09-
2.pdf#page=5 
Bem, Sandra Lipsitz. . (1981). "Gender Schema Theory: A Cognitive Account of Sex 
Typing." Psychological Review 88(4): 354-364. 
Bernard, Jessie. (1973). "My Four Revolutions: An Autobiographical History of the 
ASA." American Journal of Sociology 78(4): 773-791. 
Bombardieri, Marcella. 2006. "Summers should go, ex-Harvard dean says: Calls 
president less than truthful." in Boston Globe. Boston. Accessed at 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/02/16/summers_should_go_ex_h
arvard_dean_says/ 
Bordo, Susan. (1986). "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought." Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 11(3): 439-456. 
Coats, A.W. (1960). "The First Two Decades of the American Economic Association." 
American Economic Review 50: 555-574. 
Ely, Richard T. (1936). "The Founding and Early History of the American Economic 
Association." American Economic Review 26(1): 141-150. 
—. (1938). Ground Under Our Feet: An Autobiography. New York: Macmillan. 
England, Paula. 2003. "Separative and Soluble Selves: Dichotomous Thinking in 
Economics" In Feminist Economics Today: Beyond Economic Man, Eds. M.A. 
Ferber and J.A. Nelson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
England, Paula, and Nancy Folbre. 2005. "Gender and Economic Sociology" In 
Handbook of Economic Sociology, Eds. Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg. 
Princeton and New York: Princeton University Press and Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Ferber, Marianne A., and Julie A. Nelson (Eds.). 1993. Beyond Economic Man: Feminist 
Theory and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
— (Eds.). 2003. Feminist Economics Today. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Furner, Mary O. (1975). Advocacy & Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of 
American Social Science, 1865-1905. Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky. 
Gillin, John Lewis. (1927). "The Development of Sociology in the United States." Papers 
and Proceedings Twenty-First Annual Meeting American Sociological Society 21: 
1-25. 
Harding, Sandra. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
17 
GDAE Working Paper No. 09-04: Sociology, Economics, and Gender 
 
 
Haskell, Thomas L. (1977). The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The 
American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of 
Authority. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Keller, Evelyn Fox. (1985). Reflections on Gender and Science. New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press. 
Laslett, Barbara. (1990). "Unfeeling Knowledge: Emotion and Objectivity in the History 
of Sociology." Sociological Forum 5: 413-433. 
Longino, Helen. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in 
Scientific Inquiry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Mill, John Stuart. (1836). "On the Definition of Political Economy; and On the Method of 
Philosophical Investigation in That Science." London and Westminster Review: 1-
29. 
Nelson, Julie A. 1993. "The Study of Choice or the Study of Provisioning? Gender and 
the Definition of Economics" In Beyond Economic Man, Eds. Marianne Ferber 
and Julie A. Nelson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Nelson, Julie A. (1992). "Thinking About Gender." Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist 
Philosophy 7(3): 138-154. 
—. 1996. "Feminist Economics: Objective, activist and postmodern?" In Postmodernism, 
Economics and Knowledge, Eds. Stephen Cullenberg, Jack Amariglio, and David 
F. Ruccio. London Routledge. 
—. (2006a). "Can We Talk? Feminist Economists in Dialogue with Social Theorists." 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 31(4): 1052-1074. 
—. (2006b). Economics for Humans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ogburn, William F. (1930). "The Folkways of a Scientific Sociology." Publications of 
the American Sociological Society 24: 1-11. 
Robbins, Lionel. (1935). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. 
London: Macmillan. 
Roos, Charles F. (1933). "The Organization of the Econometric Society in Cleveland, 
Ohio, December 1930." Econometrica 1: 71-72. 
Ross, Dorothy. (1991). The Origins of American Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Section on Economic Sociology. 2007. "Mission Statement." 
http://www.asanet.org/cs/root/leftnav/sections/section_pages/section_on_economi
c_sociology 
Silverberg, Helene (Ed.). 1998. Gender and American Social Science: The Formative 
Years. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Small, Albion W. (1916). "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States." The American 
Journal of Sociology 21(6): 721-864. 
Smelser, Neil J., and Richard Swedberg (Eds.). 2005a. The Handbook of Economic 
Sociology. Princeton and New York: Princeton University Press and Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
—. 2005b. "Introducing Economic Sociology" In Handbook of Economic Sociology, Eds. 
Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg. Princeton and New York: Princeton 
University Press and Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
18 
GDAE Working Paper No. 09-04: Sociology, Economics, and Gender 
 
 
Smith, Mark C. (1994). Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate Over 
Objectivity and Purpose, 1918-1941. Durham and London: Duke University 
Press. 
Spalter-Roth, Roberta, and Janene Scelza. 2008. "Sociology Faculty Salaries, AY 2007-
08." in Research Brief: Department of Research and Development: American 
Sociological Association. Accessed at http://www.asanet.org/galleries/default-
file/Salaries%200708%20Brief%20Revised%200608.pdf 
Stacey, Judith, and Barrie Thorne. (1985). "The Missing Feminist Revolution in 
Sociology." Social Problems 32(4): 301-316. 
Tobin, James. (1985). "Neoclassical Theory in America: J.B. Clark and Fisher." 
American Economic Review 75: 28-38. 
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. 2008. "IPEDS 
Completions." NCES. Accessed at http://caspar.nsf.gov/TableBuilder 
Ward, Lester F. (1907). "The Establishment of Sociology." American Journal of 
Sociology 12(5): 581-587. 
Zelizer, Viviana A. (2005). The Purchase of Intimacy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
19 
GDAE Working Paper No. 09-04: Sociology, Economics, and Gender 
 
 
 
20 
                                                
NOTES 
 
1 Twenty-two names are gender-ambiguous, but most likely refer to males.  
2 A number of histories of the development of the social science discipline in the United States exist. Some 
of these are sensitive to gender issues—especially the essays in Silverberg (1998)—but most neglect 
gender or at most give it only a brief mention (Furner 1975; Haskell 1977; Ross 1991; Smith 1994).   
3  See, for example, Bernard (1973), Stacey and Thorne (1985), and Acker (2006) for discussions of 
obstacles to feminist research in sociology, and Ferber and Nelson (1993; 2003) for discussion of the state 
of feminism within economics.  
4 To ease exposition, the phrase the “discipline of economics” in this paper will refer to the dominant, 
neoclassically-centered, “mainstream” of the discipline. Attention to interesting, but historically 
marginalized, schools such as radical and Institutional economics, or contemporary specialty fields such as 
behavioral or neuro-economics, would take this essay too far afield. This essay also focuses only on the 
United States. While there are those who claim that while the discipline of economics might have had the 
biases described at one time in its history, it is now non-sexist and has gone beyond its neoclassical roots to 
become truly open to diverse models and methodologies, many publications by feminist and other 
heterodox economists document the opposite. 
5 The work of Susan Bordo (1986) would apply here. 
6 Although this image is present in only a few passages of Smith’s work, and is contradicted elsewhere, it is 
the part of Smith’s legacy which has had the most effect on the development of economics. See Nelson 
(2006b). 
7 “Sociology as a science is not interested in making the world a better place in which to live,” claimed 
Ogburn (1930, 2). 
8 I find accounts suggesting more cooperative and mutually respectful relations among economists and 
sociologists, such as in Aspers et al. (2008) rather suspect.  This is probably due to a problem of small and 
biased samples: Sociologists will be drawn to read only those parts of the economic literature (often 
marginalized within the economics profession) they find interesting and have the mathematical skills to 
digest, while the only economists willing to engage with sociologists are the relatively few who think such 
communication  might be worthwhile.  
9 For more on the problems created by this dichotomy, analyzed in terms of Habermasian concepts of  “life 
world” versus “system,” see Nelson (2006a; 2006b). 
10 While proposing that economic sociologists consider using some rational choice theories, England and 
Folbre (2005) also—rather undermining their own argument—systematically point out how these theories 
fail empirically. 
11 See, for example, the discussion in England and Folbre (2005, footnote 2) of sociologists’ use of the 
terms “culture,” “norms,” and “institutions.” 
12 Jessie Bernard (1973) presented an analysis of research approaches that can be analyzed with this 
compass. Drawing on research in psychology, she classified sociological approaches as either “agentic” and 
focused on “separation, repression, conquest, and contract” (784-5) or “communal” which is “much 
humbler” (785) and focused on “fusion, expression, acceptance,…cooperation.” She identifies the agentic 
approach with machismo, and seems to argue that while it is appropriate for some subjects, women and 
communal approaches are more appropriate for “status world” subjects. By valorizing the humility of the 
“communal” approach and associating “agentic” mostly with negatively-valenced terms such as 
“repression,” she seems to be outlining an F+/M- diagonal.  But by arguing (along “hostile worlds” lines) 
that there exists an emotion-free, impersonal “cash nexus world” to which agentic methods apply, she gives 
far too much over to mechanical images of economics. She also seems unaware of the dangers of 
servility—which is closely related to the characteristic of “solubility” discussed in Nelson (1992) and 
England  (2003).  
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